Quarterly Letter

2025 Q1 Letter

Dear Partners, ███, and Friends,

What a difference three months makes—or even, it seems, just three days. We entered 2025 in a hopeful mood but it’s anyone’s guess how the next quarter will shake out. Fears of a prolonged and disruptive trade war pushed the stock market down. And then down some more. The NASDAQ officially hit bear market territory. Talk of a global recession grows. Who knows what is to come?

Do not look to a venture capitalist for solid macroeconomic prognostication; it’s not what we do well. Still, these unsettled conditions make me grateful that Viewpoint’s thesis and the disruption it identifies are agnostic to macroeconomic conditions. ████ ████ ████ ██████████ ██ ███ ████████ ██████████ ████ ██ ███ ████ █████████ ████ ██████ ███ ██ ████ ██████████████ ████ ████████ ███ ████ ██████████ █████████ ███ █████ ██ ████████ ███████████ ███ ████████ ████ ██ ██████ █████ ██ ███ ███ ██ ████ ████ ████ █ ██ ███ ███ ██████ ███ ███ ████████ █████

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Further validation comes from Turtlemint—a company from my pre-Viewpoint portfolio—which recently announced plans for an IPO. Turtlemint is a perfect example of Viewpoint's thesis, and it illustrates the scale and impact of aggregating demand through producer-led platforms. I led Turtlemint’s Series B round at my prior fund, █████████ ██ █████████████ █ ████ ███████ █████████ ██████ ███ ████ ███████████ ██ █████ ██ ████. Dhiren and Anand are exceptional founders and have built an industry-leading platform that now dominates insurance distribution in India.

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Venture will have (deservedly) a very high bar for performance going forward

The bar for performance in venture capital should be extremely high. VC general partners (like me) ask LPs to lock up their capital for ten years (usually more for early-stage funds). The LPs don’t know the specific companies we will be investing in. And GPs charge high fees (2% of assets under management and 20% of profits). In exchange, we should be driving outstanding performance.

Venture hasn’t delivered that in recent years. And LPs know it. This lackluster performance—and the snail’s pace at which capital is coming back to investors—is clearly giving LPs pause. Capital flows into venture, after reaching an insane peak in 2021, have dropped back to 2015 levels.

There’d been some hope that IPOs and M&A activity would pick up this year, freeing up capital to be reinvested. But only CoreWeave got out the door before the tariff turmoil set in. Stripe, Klarna and Chime, three darlings of the fintech VC world, had been expected to go public this year, but Wall Street’s tariff turmoil has now thrown that into doubt. Add to that, year-to-date, US M&A activity is down 14% (while up globally). Until some capital starts coming back to LPs to reinvest, venture markets will continue to be depressed.

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But it’s not just lack of liquidity holding LPs back. There’s also uncertainty about the past and future performance of private equity generally and venture specifically.

AngelList, a platform for early-stage VCs, published a remarkable chart earlier this year. It shows the total value to paid-in capital (TVPI) per vintage year (net of fees). This data includes more than 15,000 early-stage startups invested in by VC funds on AngelList’s platform.

At first glance, some vintages just look better than others. 2017 is currently running at a net 4x TVPI. Vintage 2021 is still at a 1x four years after starting. Notice, though, how all at once every vintage flatlines halfway through what would be 2021.

It is possible that the startups within these vintages will grow past that period of widely inflated valuations. These TVPI numbers could remain flat or even rise by the time the funds return their capital to LPs. It’s also possible that these perfectly flat lines reflect VCs’ bias against marking down their portfolios. If that’s the case, expect to see these lines turn downward eventually. Time will tell.

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LPs are searching for performance (a dive into the research)

Not only is less new money flowing into venture, it’s also being consolidated. As articles in the Financial Times, The New York Times and other business outlets pointed out in early January, of the $71 billion invested in venture in 2024, more than half was vacuumed up by just nine huge VC firms.

If LPs are looking for incredible performance, this clustering feels paradoxical. In any alpha-seeking business (hedge funds, PE, VC), size is the enemy of returns. Massive VC funds are, simply by virtue of their capitalization, diluting the effect of their big wins. A $300 million cash return to LPs is amazing for a $300 million VC fund; it’s a tiny bump to a $3 billion fund.

LPs know this. So why the flight to giant VC firms? I believe they are looking for exceptional fund managers, and these mega-funds have the advantages of a recognized brand and track records of success. Particularly after flatlining of the 2018-2021 vintages, LPs are choosing to trade the potential for exceptional performance for a higher chance at sufficient performance.

Fund size aside, LPs are right to be more rigorous in their manager selection. In venture, manager selection is everything.

I recently came across a 2024 research study, “Understanding Private Fund Performance,” that examined the net performance of 6,000 North American private funds from 1980 to 2022. The first thing the authors found was venture capital’s performance varies much more widely than other forms of private investment such as private credit or private equity (buyout): the highs are higher and the lows lower. As measured by TVPI, the highest-performing funds (top 5%) deliver returns that are 2.5x that of the average fund.

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This result isn’t shocking. Venture isn’t about the average fund managers finding the average company; it’s about great managers finding amazing companies. Another study from 2020, “Private Equity Portfolio Companies: A First Look at Burgiss Holdings Data,” captured this in the data of 45,000 specific investments within buyout and venture funds. It’s illustrated by this chart on the left, called a Lorenz Curve. The shape of this curve reveals how evenly—or unevenly—the returns are generated. The gray, diagonal, dotted line represents a perfectly even distribution, as if each investment created an equal share of value. The farther the curve bends downward (away from the diagonal line), the more unequal the distribution, meaning fewer investments produce most of the value. As the orange line shows, for VC funds, the top 20% of investments generates a huge portion—about 80%—of the portfolio’s returns.

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So, for those top 95th percentile funds, do they just get lucky on a single deal?

Bear with me through one more paper, this one from 2023 titled, “Has Persistence Persisted in Private Equity? Evidence from Buyout and Venture Capital Funds.” It suggests that superior fund performance is persistent. In their historical sample, Managers whose previous fund was in the top quartile had an average PME (public market equivalent, a measure comparing fund returns to public markets) of 2.22 for their subsequent fund. Those with a previous fund in the bottom quartile averaged a PME of just 0.75. This means investors could have done almost three times better by consistently investing in VC firms with a track record of high performance. Also interesting: The persistence effect stretched back through two prior funds. That suggests that strong performance genuinely reflects repeatable skills or advantages of certain VC firms, not just a few lucky deals.

The value of our portfolio companies being “holistic”

As you know, Viewpoint invests exclusively in industries where human producers—call them agents, brokers, advisers—control client demand. We’ve noticed a striking theme in our portfolio: Four of Viewpoint’s ████████ companies (Farther, PLACE, Spark, and Goodwin) share an unusual business model. They are “holistic” offerings for the “producers” they serve, and that is driving scale.

What do we mean exactly by “holistic?” To us, it means that the startup provides the complete technology and services package. If it can meet most of a producer’s operational and strategic needs, then the producer can focus on their core revenue-generating activities.

PLACE and Farther started out providing a core suite of tools and a few services to real estate teams and financial advisers, respectively. Over time they kept improving their technology and adding new services. Their message to producers is clear and impactful: “Today, you spend more than 50% of your time on tasks we can do for you. Our platform—combining technology and services—will let you to spend up to 90% of your time on high-value, revenue-generating activities.”

The more all-encompassing a platform becomes, the more valuable it is to its users. That makes it easier to attract new producers. █████ █████ ██ █████ ██ ██████████ ███ ████ ██ ███ ████ ████████ ███ ██ ██ ███ ██ ██████████ █████████ ████ ██████ ███████ ██ ███ █████████ █████ ██████ █████████ █████ ██ █████ ██████████ █████ ███ █ █████ ██████ █████████ ██ ██████ ███████ ███ █ ███ █████████ ██ █████ █████ ██████████

This is already a powerful formula for sustained growth of scale. But there’s one more thing to note about producers. They are a prime example of the Pareto principle: The top 20% of them get 80% of the business. That means platforms like Farther and PLACE can secure large portions of a total market via a relatively small number of high-volume producers. Farther increased its number of financial advisers by 90% but its assets under management roughly tripled because the new advisers came in with much bigger books of business.

Finally, there’s this unanticipated outcome of holistic models: as platforms broaden their suite of services, they unlock new revenue streams. Payment processing, managing float, vertical integration, and cross-selling closely related products are now on the table. PLACE’s entrance into mortgage origination and title insurance, Farther’s proprietary investment product: “Farther Asset Management,” and Goodwin's payments integration illustrate these strategies in action.

This all compounds in a virtuous cycle. With each incremental expansion of their offerings, these platforms attract more and larger producers, and can collect more revenue from transactions. As scale grows, revenue-per-producer continuously accelerates. This leaves competitors fundamentally disadvantaged: How does one compete effectively when a rival can earn more—sustainably—from the same producer activity? That’s a tough moat to get across. And it is especially propitious in these winner-take-most markets.

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███ ██ ███ ██████ █████ ████ ███████ █████ ██ ████ ██ ██ ██ ███ ██ ███ ████ ██ ██████ Over the last three years we've discovered how our thesis applies to dozens of industries (60+ and counting) but we haven’t had the capacity to “take down” these new markets systematically. With new team members, we will!

Lastly, we're in full production mode for our founders' retreat in the fall. I'm excited to share more about that in a future letter.

Fondly,

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Drew Aldrich, Managing Partner

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